Doctors under the microscope: the birth of medical audit by Jackson, William J. et al.
  
 
 
This is the published version:  
 
 Jackson, William J., Paterson, Audrey S., Pong, Christopher K. M. and Scarparo, Simona 2013, Doctors under the microscope: the birth of medical audit, Accounting history review, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 23-47.     
Available from Deakin Research Online: 
 
 http://hdl.handle.net/10536/DRO/DU:30060456      Reproduced with the kind permission of the copyright owner.     
 
Copyright : 2013, Taylor & Francis 
 
This article was downloaded by: [Deakin University Library]
On: 10 February 2014, At: 14:35
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Accounting History Review
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rabf21
Doctors under the microscope: the
birth of medical audit
William J. Jackson a , Audrey S. Paterson a , Christopher K.M. Pong
b & Simona Scarparo c
a School of Management & Languages, Department of
Accountancy, Economics and Finance , Heriot-Watt University ,
Edinburgh , UK
b Nottingham University Business School , Accounting Division,
Nottingham , UK
c Faculty of Business and Law, Deakin Graduate School of
Business , Deakin University , Melbourne , Australia
Published online: 14 Mar 2013.
To cite this article: William J. Jackson , Audrey S. Paterson , Christopher K.M. Pong & Simona
Scarparo (2013) Doctors under the microscope: the birth of medical audit, Accounting History
Review, 23:1, 23-47, DOI: 10.1080/21552851.2013.773638
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2013.773638
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,
our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to
the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions
and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,
and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content
should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources
of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,
proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or
howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising
out of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any
substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,
systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
ki
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 L
ib
ra
ry
] a
t 1
4:
35
 1
0 
Fe
br
ua
ry
 2
01
4 
Accounting History Review, 2013
Vol. 23, No. 1, 23–47, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/21552851.2013.773638
Doctors under the microscope: the bir th of
medical audit
William J. Jacksona, Audrey S. Patersona, Christopher K.M. Pongb
and Simona Scarparoc∗
a School of Management & Languages, Department of Accountancy, Economics and Finance, Heriot-Watt University,
Edinburgh, UK; bNottingham University Business School, Accounting Division, Nottingham, UK; cFaculty of Business
and Law, Deakin Graduate School of Business, Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
(Received September 2011; final version received December 2012)
In 1989 a UK government White Paper introduced medical audit as a comprehensive and statutory system of
assessment and improvement in quality of care in hospitals. A considerable body of research has described the
evolution of medical audit in terms of a struggle between doctors and National Health Service managers over
control of quality assurance. In this paper we examine the emergence of medical audit from 1910 to the early
1950s, with a particular focus on the pioneering work of the American surgeons Codman, MacEachern and
Ponton. It is contended that medical professionals initially created medical audit in order to articulate a suitable
methodology for assessing individual and organisational performance. Rather than a means of protecting the
medical profession from public scrutiny, medical auditing was conceived and operationalised as a managerial tool
for fostering the active engagement of senior hospital managers and discharging public accountability. These early
debates reveal how accounting was implicated in the development of a system for monitoring and improving the
work of medical professionals, advancing the quality of hospital care, and was advocated in ways, which included
rather than excluded managers.
Keywords: medical audit; professional accounting; quality of care; end results
Introduction
During the last three decades both Labour and Conservative governments in the UK have imple-
mented radical reforms of the National Health Service (NHS), asserting that measurement,
evaluation and continuous improvement in the quality of service ought to be of paramount impor-
tance in the governance of the health care. In 1989 the government introduced mandatory medical
audit ostensibly as a method for fostering the assessment and improvement of quality of care,
assessing clinicians’ performance, and to function as a mechanism for monitoring clinicians’
accountability (The Scottish Office 1989; The Secretary of State for Health 1989). A considerable
body of research has described medical audit in this context as a ‘contested field’ in which doctors
and NHS managers struggled for control of quality assurance (Dent 1991; Packwood, Kerrison,
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© 2013 Taylor & Francis
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24 W.J. Jackson et al.
and Buxton 1994; Power 1997). The literature argues that whilst UK medical professionals feared
that managers would impose a form of audit that would impinge upon their professional autonomy,
managers worried that they would be unable to guarantee the effective system of audit required
by the Department of Health, if clinicians were entirely in control of the process (Harman and
Martin 1992). Studies suggest that this tension has led some medical professionals to use medical
audit as a means of defending their own interests against increasing demands for public scrutiny
and accountability (Pollitt 1990, 1993; Dent 1991, 1993, 1995; Smith et al. 1992). It is contended
here that understanding the debate about medical audit in these terms is excessively narrow, both
spatially and temporally. Studies appear to be insufficiently sensitive to the fact that medical
professionals debated medical auditing, long before it was assimilated within the managerial
structures of the NHS.
Since the beginning of the twentieth-century medical professionals outside the UK, and in the
USA in particular, have discussed the need to measure and evaluate the outcomes and quality of
medical care and to foster accountability amongst practitioners. Intrinsic to this discussion was the
recognition of the need to develop an appropriate methodology for these measurement practices.
This debate featured as part of a broader redefinition of the nature and boundaries of medical care
and the role of critical self-reflection as a learning tool within the medical profession. It took place
long before the creation of the national health system in the UK and the subsequent imposition
of managerial reforms by government.
By examining the emergence of medical audit from 1910 to the early 1950s, with particular
focus on the pioneering work of the American surgeons Codman, MacEachern and Ponton, this
paper challenges the prevailing argument of Power (1997) and Dent (1991, 1993, 1995) that
medical professionals developed medical auditing as a strategy of resistance to processes of public
scrutiny. Instead, we argue that medical professionals initially created medical audit in order to
articulate a suitable methodology for assessing individual and organisational performance. To
this end, medical auditing was conceived and operationalised as a managerial tool for fostering
the active engagement of hospitals’ senior managers and for discharging public accountability. It
was not perceived as a means of protecting the medical profession from public scrutiny. This is
crucial to understanding the genesis of medical audit, because it allows us to identify the potential
benefits involved in developing managerial processes designed to improve medical outcomes
rather than enhancing managerial control. Early debates reveal that accounting featured in the
development of a system for monitoring and improving the work of medical professionals and the
quality of hospital care in ways which sought to include managers rather than exclude them. This
contradicts the prevailing contemporary view that the relationship between medical professionals
and non-medical managers is fundamentally conflictual.
The paper also attempts to augment the growing body of literature on the history of accounting in
hospitals. To date, this literature has been characterised by UK centrism and a focus on voluntarism
before the NHS (Cherry 1996; Berry 1997; Robson 2006; Jones and Mellett 2007; Holden, Funnell,
and Oldroyd 2009; Jackson 2010, 2012) or the immediate aftermath of the formation of the NHS
(Robson 2003). Little research has been performed outside the UK context with the exception
of Seville’s (1987) study of the emergence of accounting practice in US voluntary hospitals
(though this only briefly touches on accounting before 1950) (Seville 1987, 61–63), the study of
Irish voluntary failure by Lapsley and Robbins (2008), the examination of early French hospital
accounts by Lacombe-Saboly (1997) and the work of Van Peursem, Pratt, and Tower (1996) on
the New Zealand hospital sector. The paucity of research into hospital accounting beyond the
UK leaves us with a partial view of hospital accounting practice in general and medical audit in
particular. Through an examination of the debates about the use of medical audit in North America
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during thefirst half of the twentieth century, this study also seeks to contribute to understandings of
the emergence, uses and possibilities of hospital accounting practice.A final intended contribution
derives from the focus of the study on the use of accounting practices by medical professionals;
a perspective seldom in evidence in the historical accounting literature.
To explore the emergence of medical audit we examined the debates surrounding the practice
that featured in published works and other media. The aim was to comprehend both normative
presentations of best practice and the professional responses to them. In particular, the focus was
on the medical rather than the accounting profession. Hence, our searches centred on medical
rather than accounting publications. The sources of data utilised for the research consisted of the
pamphlets and books published by the key authors whose work is analysed in this paper. These
were accessed through a number of websites.1 A wide range of articles appearing in North Amer-
ican medical journals was also used. The search for relevant sources was performed through a
series of thematic queries of medical databases: PubMed, Ovid, Medline, BMJ journals,American
MedicalAssociation journals, and of multi-disciplinary databases: JSTOR, EBSCO and ProQuest.
The searches were performed using the following key words: medical audit, follow-up systems,
end result, hospital standardisation, and yielded around 2000 articles (including editorials, com-
mentary sections and correspondence). These were further sorted by relevance. The authors also
looked for links between the outputs of key authors, tracing citations to follow the genesis of ideas
and developing discourses among the medical professionals.
The paper proceeds by,first offering a brief overview of the academic literature on medical audit
in the UK, identifying it as a field of contest between medical professionals and managers within
the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm. This is used to identify the state of research into
the emergence of medical audit and to provide a basis for contrast with the earlier debates in North
America. Second, we analyse the pioneering work promoted by Dr Codman on the measurement
of the results of care, the ‘end-result’ system, and the programme of hospital standardisation of
the American College of Surgeons (ACS), which took place in the period 1910–1920. Third,
we discuss the process of systematisation and standardisation promoted by Dr MacEachern and
Dr Ponton between 1920 and 1940. These actors played a crucial role in establishing the nature
and objectives of medical audit in the US hospital administration. Fourth, we provide a brief
discussion of the legacy of the work of MacEachern and Ponton, which paved the way for the
institutionalisation of medical audit in the USA and for the scholarly development of the field of
quality of care. In the conclusions, we highlight the implications of our findings.
Medical audit, NPM and medical autonomy
Several authors have argued that medical audit evolved as a contested terrain in which medical
professionals and the state fought over competing control strategies (Pollitt 1990; Dent 1991;
Pollitt 1993; Power 1997). From the 1980s onwards, the UK government sought to coerce medical
professionals into being more cost conscious and occupying managerial positions with a view to
improving efficiency and curtailing rising NHS expenditure. Previously, it was argued, medical
audit was a voluntary system of peer review of specific medical treatments performed by doctors. It
was disconnected from the managerial structures of the hospitals. Following the reforms the audit
became an example of a technique which ‘functions less as a practice of verification and more
as an explicit vehicle for change in the name of ideals, such as “cost effectiveness”, “efficiency”,
“quality” and so on’ (Power 1997, 91) – a locus in which the UK government envisaged that
doctors would be more integrated into hospitals’ managerial structures and more accountable for
the resources they used.
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In 1989 an English White Paper “Working for patients” (The Secretary of State for Health)
and a Scottish working paper “Medical audit. Scottish working paper” (The Scottish Office 1989)
drafted a model for the organisation of medical audit in hospital and community health services.
They suggested the establishment, at local level, of a medical advisory committee2 chaired by
a senior clinician, and composed of representatives of the major medical specialities, general
practice and doctors representing the health board management in Scotland, and the District
General Manager in England (The Scottish Office 1989, para. 14(a); The Secretary of State for
Health 1989, para. 4.2(a)). This model aimed to create a basis for discussion on ‘how an effective
framework for medical audit might be implemented’ (The Secretary of State for Health 1989; The
Scottish Office 1989). This programmatic operational structure did not provide details about who
decided on the objectives of the evaluation process or the identity of the ultimate constituency
that the audit was intended to serve (Power 1997, 105). The vacuum thus created led medical
professionals to fear that managers would take control of the process of evaluation through external
auditing programmes (Pollitt 1993). The organised medical profession countered by promoting
a system of medical audit that was concerned with quality of care rather than costs (Dent 1993),
engineering a process of ‘inverse decoupling’, through which existing local internal evaluation
practices were preserved. These practices were voluntary and devoid of external scrutiny and
disciplinary sanctions (Power 1997; Pollitt 1993).3
In tracing the history of medical audit, the existing literature focuses on ‘the interplay and
conflict’ between managerial and professional strategies, and more broadly, on understanding the
‘mutually ambivalent relationship’between the state and the medical profession (Dent 1995). The
ambivalence arises due to the medical professional’s strategy of resistance while being fully incor-
porated in the NHS and the constant process of negotiation of professional autonomy between the
medical profession and the state (Dent 1993). Thus the history of medical audit is analysed in rela-
tion to the emergence of a strategy of resistance to what doctors considered to be a challenge to their
professional autonomy (Dent 1991). Histories tend to centre on the reaction of the organised med-
ical profession to the potential imposition by the UK government of a form of audit or inspection
of clinical work that lay beyond the control of practising medical professionals (Dent 1991, 1995).
Within this frame of analysis, Dent argues that the medical profession developed a ‘medical
audit strategy’ which promoted the audit as a tool for defending professional interests rather than
a ‘means per se of improving the efficacy of medical diagnosis and treatment’ (Dent 1991, 77).
Importantly, Dent argues that as the audit was conceived as a tool of resistance rather than an aid to
improve quality of care, medical professionals were primarily interested in auditing the process of
care rather than its outcomes (Dent 1991, 1995). In this way attention is placed on clinicians’work
rather than on patients thereby ensuring that ‘doctors define the rules of performance themselves’
(Dent 1991, 74). In Dent’s view the medical audit strategy adopted by medical professionals was
flawed because the organised profession was unable to gain consensus among its membership as
to whether there should be medical audit or not and whether medical audit was an appropriate
instrument for protecting professional autonomy.
These arguments provided a seminal contribution to understanding the medical profession’s
response to the imposition of medical audit. However, in tracing its evolution commentators
largely ignored some remarkably ‘modern’ and contrasting ideas about medical audit developed
by influential members of the medical profession in the USA during the early twentieth century.
As we will show in the following sections of the paper, medical audit was originally devised as
a mechanism to foster ‘efficiency’, which at that time meant ‘the use of the best methods for the
achievement of the best ideas’ (Wrege 1983, 32). The audit was identified as a suitable mechanism
for the measurement and assessment of clinicians and hospital performance. At an individual
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level it was intended to provide clinicians with a system that would foster reflection on one’s
own practice (conceptualised as learning from mistakes and from colleagues’ practices revealed
as superior) with the aim of securing its improvement. At hospital level audit was perceived as
providing the institution with evidence of work performed. Furthermore, in stark contrast with
the attitudes held by UK clinicians 50 years later, prominent physicians called for hospitals’
governing bodies to engage with the management of hospital performance, using the audit as a
managerial tool to provide information for the assessment of the results of medical treatments,
the competency of medical professionals and the proper utilisation of resources.
The ‘end result’ and hospital standardisation, 1910–1920
Interest in the efficacy of healthcare practices has a long history. As early as 1690, Sir William
Petty started formulating ‘impertinent questions’ on causal relations between care provided and
outcomes measured (Williamson 1997). In 1803, the famous physician Sir Thomas Percival was
perhaps the first to propose the establishment of a hospital register to help physicians improve
the quality of care. Whilst Percival’s contemporaries did not appear to engage with his ideas,
his work became influential in the establishment of medical ethical principles adopted by the
American Medical Association in 1847 (Darr 2007). In 1860, Florence Nightingale carried out
her pioneering work on health statistics (Holden 1999, 313), which aimed to provide consistent
data for understanding the mortality and morbidity of soldiers wounded or ill and improvements
in clinical outcomes (Darr 2007).
The notion of establishing a registry that would allow a medical practitioner to evaluate the qual-
ity of care provided and its outcomes became the life-long project of Ernest A. Codman (Codman
1924, 1926), a general surgeon trained at Harvard Medical School and Massachusetts General
Hospital, widely acknowledged as the pioneer of performance reviews of medical practices (Lewis
1974; Donabedian 1989; Ballard, Spreadbury, and Hopkins 2004; Mallon 2007; Brand 2009). In
1900 Codman started a systematic follow-up of surgical patients in order to determine the out-
comes of his treatments. This approach became known as the ‘end-result’ system (Codman 1914,
1916, 1918). He argued that physicians and surgeons should systematically review the results of
the treatments provided to their patients in order to ascertain the outcomes and improve the quality
of care. Codman contended that ‘The End Result System demands an analysis of the reasons why
a case has been successful or unsuccessful, and the utilisation of the knowledge thus obtained for
avoiding future errors and for securing future success’ (Codman 1918, 66).
Ahead of his time, Codman thought that medical professionals should engage in reflective
thinking on their practice. He published a pamphlet entitled A study in hospital efficiency as
demonstrated by the case report of the first five years of a private hospital (Codman 1918), in
which he presented the summaries of 337 cases he treated from August 1911 to August 1916. For
each case, he detailed patients’ symptoms, diagnosis, treatments, eventual complications and the
results of care. He annotated each case with a symbol, which indicated either that the result was
satisfactory, or in case of unsatisfactory results, indicated the origin of the error, such as:
lack of technical knowledge or skill, lack of surgical judgement, lack of care or equipment, lack of diagnostic
skills, patient’s unconquerable disease, patient’s refusal of treatment, calamities of surgery or those accidents and
complications over which we have no control. (Codman 1918, 11)
He then reflected on whether and how the negative results could have been improved upon:
To effect improvement, the first step is to admit and record the lack of perfection. The next step is to analyse the
causes of failure and to determine whether these causes are controllable. We can then rationally set about effecting
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improvement by enforcing the control of those causes which we admit are controllable, and by directing study to
those methods of controlling those causes over which we now admit we have little power. (Codman 1918, 9)
In authoring his pamphlet Codman aimed to ‘illustrate a practical method of making such an
analysis’ (Codman 1918, 10) and to set himself as an example of how exposing the weaknesses
in one’s own practice would improve the quality of care:
We believe that the most difficult step has been taken when staff of a hospital once agrees to admit and record
the lack of perfection in the results of its treatment. Improvement is then sure to follow, for it often is the error of
which we are ignorant that we persist in carrying with us. (Codman 1918, 9)
Codman envisaged that the ‘end-result system’ could also be applied at hospital level. This would
ensure the competence of surgeons, standardisation of surgical practice and the establishment
of standards of good results. He devised an end-result card, which he considered had to be a
‘scientific record’ (Codman 1918, 71), to be used to inscribe all data necessary to operate the end-
result system. He insisted on the importance of systematic and accurate record-keeping, describing
at length a system for cataloguing the cards for each case. Record cards would be numbered and
cases classified by anatomic and pathologic diagnosis. Codman argued that the adoption of the
end-result system would not only improve the quality of care, it would also render the work
of physicians and surgeons more scientific and their practice more ‘efficient and honourable’
(Codman 1918, 64).
Codman was a visionary. At the beginning of the twentieth century there were no formalised
systems for monitoring and reporting the quality of care for scrutiny by hospital directors and
boards of trustees. Nor were there governmental agencies interested in monitoring and fostering
improvement of the quality of care. Instead, physicians were deemed to be inherently committed
to providing the best possible treatments (Ballard, Spreadbury, and Hopkins 2004). Codman
(1918, 91) lamented this absence, observing that ‘It is not customary in hospital work to set
standards; there is nothing to go by, to determine whether the work of a given hospital is efficient
or not.’
Inspired by theories of scientific management (Wrege 1983), Codman (1918, 91) insisted that
the ‘treatment of diseases, the work of hospitals, the work of individual members of hospital
staffs, knowledge, skills, judgement, and diagnosis’ could and ought to be standardised, and that
one of the aims of the hospital should be to establish these standards. In Codman’s view, the end-
result system would provide the means for applying principles of scientific management to the
organisation of the hospital. Furthermore, he envisaged that the end-result system would educate
junior medical professionals in transparent management and mechanisms of accountability. He
suggested that studying end-result cases would enhance junior surgeons’ knowledge, as these
would acquaint the practitioner with the failures and successes of their superiors. Moreover, he
advocated the annual publication of an ‘end-result report’, which would provide the public with
information about the ‘product’ of the hospital (i.e. the activities and treatments performed).
Codman thought that hospitals, both charitable and private, had a duty to inform their local
community about what they were capable of treating, and to demonstrate how they spent money:
Examples of Endowed Institutions which permit graft, nepotism, favouritism, expediency, vainglory, hypocrisy,
and evasion are far worse than these traits seen in aggressive business, where the temptation is manifest. One can
pardon evasion in social life, in business, in politics, in fun, in war, in love; but in an Endowed Institution there
seems to be no excuse for it. If such an institution cannot spend its money honestly, what an example it must set
to the next generation in teaching the methods to make money! (Codman 1918, 87, original emphasis)
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Codman’s pioneering ideas about transparency and accountability were unpopular among some
of his contemporaries. They were too radical and potentially destabilising of the power exercised
by surgeons and physicians (Donabedian 1989; Mallon 2007; Brand 2009). But for Codman,
writing in his usual forthright manner, the end-result system was indispensable if knowledge
was to be gained about the capabilities of physicians and surgeons. He criticised vehemently the
contemporary process of appointing medical professionals on the basis of seniority as opposed to
proven competence:
They [Trustees] do not seek competent men to make sure of a good result, but men who want to practice, so
that they can become competent … by making a pretense [sic] to secure ‘the best surgeon available’, they are
able to keep the balance of power in their hands. If, instead of making a pretense, they actually did seek the best
man available, it would turn the tables and put the power into the hands of the medical profession … I say ‘a
pretense’, because in this Community, year after year, appointments are made on a Seniority basis, and such a fact
is incompatible with the development of modern Medical Science. (Codman 1918, 173, original emphasis)
Codman advocated a system of appointments and promotions based on merit, on the grounds that
this benefited patients and the development of medical science:
… what we are tired of is this: of seeing the prestige of the hospitals and the medical schools used by some
members of their staffs to line their own pockets, and to help them pose as experts on those things in which they
are no more expert than we are … We want real contributions to medical science, real public demonstrations
of new methods advantageous for us to use, real efforts to manage our medical organizations … We are tired of
being criticized by men safely ensconced behind the academic fortifications and bulwarks of hospital prestige. We
want honest End Result Reports of these hospital cases which we send in to them. (Codman 1918, 124, original
emphasis)
Despite the unpopularity of his ideas among surgeons in Boston,4 Codman’s end-result approach
attracted widespread popular support (Ballard, Spreadbury, and Hopkins 2004; Mallon 2007). At
the time medical professionals were under scrutiny, albeit indirectly. The Flexner Report published
by the Carnegie Foundation in 1910 had presented a damning statement on the medical schools
in the USA and Canada. Abraham Flexner had visited 155 colleges, assessed the credentials
of those who taught in them, their methods of teaching and their facilities. His report claimed
that a large number of colleges were commercial institutions that produced a large number of
ill-trained doctors. Flexner denounced their admission standards as negligent, argued that faculty
members were inadequately credentialed, many being poorly trained local doctors rather than
physicians instructed in the science of medicine. He attacked their teaching methods, considering
that the traditional method of lecturing in large classes was uninspiring and inadequate (Flexner
1910; DiPiro 2008). Flexner stressed the importance of developing a curriculum that incorporated
clinical and laboratory-based instruction, rather than passive, classroom-based teaching (Boelen
2002). Flexner presaged Codman in arguing that physicians ought to reflect upon their practice
and gather evidence about the aptness of their decisions, exhorting the medical associations and
universities to embrace the social and preventive role of medicine rather than focusing on its
individual and curative aspect only (Flexner 1910; Boelen 2002; Halperin 2011).
The ACS, which Codman helped to found in 1913, initiated the National Standardisation Pro-
gramme for Hospitals (Dent 1991). The programme was conducted by a Committee for Hospital
Standardization (CHS) chaired by Codman. In an address given before the Philadelphia Medical
Society in 1914, Codman (1914, 491) explained that standardisation meant ‘a general move-
ment toward improving the quality of the products for which hospital funds are expended’. The
Committee collected and analysed the annual reports of large hospitals in the USA with the aim
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of determining the scope and scale of the work performed in them and publishing this data in a
report intended to enable institutions to compare their activities to others. As a result of this exer-
cise Codman complained that the annual reports did not provide sufficient accounts of hospital
activities and their outcomes. Remarkably, he argued that the annual report of a hospital should
provide some account of the ‘products’of the hospital, though acknowledging that for educational
institutions and hospitals providing this information was difficult, compared to a manufacturing
business. In discussing how to identify and measure the product of a hospital, Codman argued
that it was not sufficient to account only for inputs (number of patients treated, average length
of stay, average cost per patient), academic results (papers published) and educational activities.
These data had to be considered in the light of the outcomes of treatments, otherwise they had
limited value (Codman 1914, 496).
Perhaps, the most controversial proposition made by Codman and members of the CHS,5
was their advocacy of the annual report of each hospital as ‘a starting point’ from which ‘those
interested can begin to ask questions as to management and efficiency’ (Codman 1914, 494).
Codman, and the CHS, suggested that each hospital should appoint an efficiency committee
(Codman 1914, 1916, 1918), consisting of a trustee, a member of staff, and a superintendent,
whose role would be to implement the end-result system in a systematic way, thus providing
hospitals with a formalised structure for assessing and reporting outcomes. He considered that ‘It
is a disagreeable Duty which neither the Staff nor the Board of Trustees nor the Superintendent
has the strength to assume alone. An Efficiency Committee composed of members of each of
these departments should assume this burden’ (Codman 1918, 7–8).
Codman and the CHS argued that the cooperation of staff, trustees and administrator was
necessary in order to implement the end-result system. In particular, they stressed the importance
of having a member of the Board of Trustees on the committee, observing that ‘if tracing the
results to the patients is equivalent to auditing the accounts, the trustees should take a hand in it’
(Codman 1916, 120). Furthermore, they argued that the Board of Trustees would play a crucial
role in authorising the creation of an efficiency committee, in fostering its establishment and
participating in it:
In our previous reports we have dwelt on this point with especial emphasis for we believe that hospital trustees
are primarily responsible for therapeutic efficiency as well as for efficiency in other departments. We believe that
a layman can ask, ‘Was the patient relieved of his symptoms? If not, why not?,’ and judge fairly well whether the
surgeon who operated and the superintendent give him reasonable answers … We hold that the mere presence of
a trustee on this committee to ask sensible questions would be a point of the greatest importance in correcting
hospital abuses. (Codman 1916, 119–120, original emphasis)
It is clear, therefore, that neither Codman or the other members of the CHS were opposed to the
involvement of managers in the functioning of the efficiency committee nor to their use of the data
produced by the end-result system. On the contrary, they advocated greater engagement of the
trustees in the management of the hospital, arguing that they bore responsibility not only for finan-
cial performance, but also for the clinical performance of a hospital. They valued the contribution
that board of trustees’members could bring in terms of granting authority for the establishment of
the efficiency committee and in terms of their ability to ask simple and pertinent questions about
whether patients had benefited from treatments administered by medical professionals.
Codman and the CHS were not isolated voices. At a meeting of the Hospital Administration
Section of the Massachusetts Medical Society in June 1917, John G. Bowman, the Director of the
ACS (who managed to obtain a gift of $30,000 from the Carnegie Foundation for financing the
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standardisation programme (Roberts, Coale, and Redman 1987)), argued that Boards of Trustees
had to be informed about the quality of care provided by the hospital:
First, the facts with regard to the efficiency of the hospital, and the meaning of these facts in relation to the welfare
of patients, must be brought home to the boards of trustees or the governing authorities, whatever they may be.
(Bowman 1917, 284)
But the mere receipt of such facts was not enough. Trustees had to recognise their responsibility
for fostering the accountability of the hospital to its community:
The individual trustee must feel his responsibility; he must realize keenly his position of trust. The hospital is
a public institution, no matter who owns it, and it is accountable to the public for the character of its work. A
great majority of hospital trustees, in my opinion, have only a hazy idea of what their trusteeships mean. For
example, if in one hospital in a community there is a mortality of 18% among appendicitis cases, and in another
hospital a mortality of 3% among similar cases, the time has come for many pertinent questions. Do the trustees
ask the questions? Has the public a right to ask questions? If you were to be operated upon for appendicitis in that
community, would you ask questions? (Bowman 1917, 284)
Bowman suggested that trustees would fulfil their responsibility if they engaged more with the
management of hospitals, withdrawing privileges to doctors who practised fee-splitting, ensuring
that surgical operations were performed after diagnosis confirmed by laboratory analysis, and
promoting accurate case-record-keeping.
Similarly, the Chief Surgeon of the New York Woman’s Hospital, George G. Ward, addressing
the Hospital Graduate Club in New York in March 1918, argued that governors and trustees were
responsible for the type of care and treatment provided to the patients and not solely for financial
performance: ‘They [trustees] should demand and see that they get efficient results for the money
they expend. Their responsibility can only be fulfilled when they have provided a conscientious,
efficient medical staff, and a competent, tactful superintendent’ (Ward 1918, 67) and clinicians
should be obliged to:
educate the trustees as to their responsibilities and when we can show them that efficiency in the hospital, just as
efficiency in the factory, is an economic problem, they will become interested. Bancroft’s statement – ‘that every
cured and satisfied patient leaving the hospital is an asset and every unimproved or dissatisfied patient is a liability’
– is just as true in the medical world as its counterpart is in the business world. (Ward 1918, 67)
Thus, Codman,6 members of the CHS and other influential clinicians argued for the establishment
of a system of accountability and transparency in which both managers and medical professionals
were to be engaged in order to promote better quality care and advance medical practice.
From ‘end result’ to medical audit, 1920–1940
During the 1920s and 1930s, the end-result system and standardisation became more formalised
and systematised within the medical audit. Two key figures championed this transformation – Dr
Malcolm MacEachern and Dr Thomas R. Ponton. Both joined the staff of the ACS in the early
1920s and became highly respected leaders in thefield of hospital administration and medical audit
respectively. MacEachern was a Canadian physician who held the position of General Superin-
tendent at Vancouver General Hospital from 1913 to 1922. In 1923 he joined the ACS as Associate
Director of Hospital Activities and in 1935 was appointed Chairman of the Administrative Board
of the ACS. He then became Director in 1949 and Director Emeritus in 1951. Whilst working for
the ACS, in 1943 MacEachern founded the hospital administration programme at Northwestern
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University Medical School, and held the position of Special Lecturer in HospitalAdministration at
Cook County School of Nursing. He was affiliated to a great number of professional organisations,
nationally and internationally, and received numerous awards (Obituary 1956, 577).
In addressing the Ontario MedicalAssociation in June 1921, MacEachern eulogised the hospital
standardisation programme and exhorted the members to embrace it. He argued that this process
of evaluating medical work was more important than the financial audits routinely performed in
hospitals:
There is in all hospitals today careful financial audit at regular periods and how much more important it is that
there should be an efficient medical audit on the work done in the hospital. All this work should be analysed by
the staff, whether it is good, bad or otherwise, and this too should be done at regular intervals. (MacEachern 1922,
523)
In order to encourage hospitals to standardise their work, the ACS published a set of minimum
standards. These stated that: hospitals had to employ medical staff which were competent and
behaved ethically; medical records were to be adequately written and filed; a system of end result
should be established with regular staff meetings to review cases; and each hospital should have
adequate diagnostic facilities (clinical laboratory and radiology). Examples of the implementation
of end-result and follow-up systems were published, highlighting the various methodologies
adopted and emphasising the benefits obtained (Howard 1915; Bancroft 1916; Corscaden 1916;
Gibson 1916; Capps 1917; Simmons 1917; Stanton 1917; Ward 1918; Bowman 1919; Editorial
1919; Warner 1919). Surveys of 687 hospitals in the USA and Canada by the ACS between 1918
and 1920 showed that in 1918, only 89 met the minimum standards required. However, the number
increased to 198 in 1919 and to 407 in 1920 (MacEachern 1922; Roberts, Coale, and Redman
1987).
Whilst an increasing number of hospitals were adopting the minimum standards published by
the ACS, MacEachern (1952, 49) argued that the level of analysis and review of medical work was
not as ‘intense and thorough as desired’. In his view, the process of review and analysis, which
he labelled as ‘medical audit’, should be formalised and applicable to all members of the medical
staff, rather than to only those in certain specialties (mostly within surgery).
It was Ponton, however, who sought to determine how best to organise medical records of
performance and compare these with standards set from experience. Ponton was also a Canadian
physician, who served in the Canadian Expeditionary Forces in the First World War and subse-
quently became first assistant to MacEachern (as the General Superintendent of the Vancouver
General Hospital) and then Medical Director when MacEachern resigned in 1923. Ponton had
worked periodically for the ACS hospital survey, but following his resignation from the Vancou-
ver General Hospital he worked full time on it in 1923 and 1924 (Ponton 1939). The end-result
system used in the Woman’s Hospital in New York and introduced by George Ward in 1918, was
considered to be a form of medical audit most suited to specialist hospitals. Ponton aimed to find
a methodology of medical audit that would be applicable to all types of hospitals. He devised a
system of medical auditing that relied on what he called ‘professional service accounting’. This
was incorporated in the ACS standards (Ponton 1939; MacEachern 1952) and published in the
book The Medical Staff in the Hospital in 1939.7
Ponton and MacEachern conceived medical audit as a system of data collection, reporting and
analysis embedded within the hospital administration. They distinguished between professional
accounting and medical audit, defining the former as ‘the technique or process of compiling the
information pertaining to the professional activities of the hospital’, and the latter as ‘the analysis
and evaluation of the data collected through professional service accounting’ (Ponton 1939, 169;
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MacEachern 1952). In the following two subsections we discuss the nature and objectives of
medical audit as devised by Ponton and MacEachern and how they envisaged embedding the
audit within the administrative systems of hospitals.
The nature and objectives of professional accounting and medical audit
In describing the system of professional accounting and medical audit, Ponton and MacEachern
stressed the importance of keeping accurate medical records, equating these to the books of prime
entry in a financial bookkeeping system. They provided examples of various types of charts and
forms that were designed to simplify record collection and keeping, a task they suggested should
be executed by a medical record librarian (also advocated as a suitable job for a woman). Once
collected the data would be entered into a medical record review form (Figure 1).A medical auditor
or medical audit committee would complete the medical record review forms. At this stage, the
auditor or audit committee assessed the outcome of the treatment for each case, classifying the
outcome under the following four categories (Ponton 1939, 176): diagnosis was not justified,
judgement faulty, treatment not warranted, erroneous technic [sic]. Additionally, the audit would
determine if complications were inevitable or preventable, and whether the removal of normal
tissue during surgery was justified or not. The auditors also indicated on the form if a case was
deemed to be especially interesting, and therefore, useful for educational purposes. In fact the
whole medical staff was presented with the findings of the medical audit, which were reported
anonymously and discussed for the purpose of group education. It was stressed that there was to
be no attempt to assign blame or fault. As Ponton (1939, 177) stated, ‘discussions are conducted
in a wholly objective manner as all should be interested in the reasons for unsatisfactory results
and in the steps necessary to avoid repetition’.
The data was then organised by the medical librarian to compile the following indexes: physi-
cians’ index, disease index, index of operations and patients’ index. The physicians’ index was
a strictly confidential record of the work performed by individual physicians, and it was avail-
able only to the administration, medical auditors and the individual staff concerned. The disease
index facilitated the grouping of cases by disease in accordance with the Standard Nomenclature
of Diseases and Operations, which medical staff had to follow when recording diagnosis.8 The
index of operations permitted the filing of cases by one, or a combination of operations. This
classification was also based on the Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations. The
patients’ index was organised on the basis of patient name so that information could be retrieved
easily if subsequently needed.
The information was then used to prepare monthly reports of hospital services (Figure 2). These
reports showed the results achieved in treating patients (classifying these as: number of patients
improved, not improved, not treated, in for diagnosis only, and deaths) and the race and religion of
patients (showing the numbers of each). Ponton and MacEachern considered this section to be not
particularly interesting as these were ‘gross results’useful only for attracting attention to areas that
needed further investigation. The report also presented specific details of the services provided
by the hospital, showing for each service: the number of patients; the number of patients that
acquired infections; the number of deaths; the number of autopsies; the number of consultations
and the number of patients’ per day. The data of this section was presented in absolute values and
in percentages to allow comparison with the results of previous months.
The report also showed the number of physicians that attended patients and the number of staff
meetings attended by physicians during the month. The latter was deemed to provide information
about the interest demonstrated by the medical staff in ‘self-education and promotion of efficiency’
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Figure 1. Medical record review form.
Source: Adapted from Ponton (1939, 175).
(Ponton 1939, 201). The report also provided statistical data on the usage of laboratory and other
special departments. This report was for the governing body and only for internal circulation ‘so
that the governing body may acquire an appreciation of the activities and difficulties of the medical
staff’ (Ponton 1939, 202). The data collected through ‘professional accounting’ and summarised
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Figure 2. Monthly reports of hospital services.
Source: Adapted from Ponton (1953, 198).
in the monthly reports was analysed through the medical audit. The main objective of medical
audit was stated as ‘not so much to present facts as to determine causes, with the intention of
preventing undesirable results’ (Ponton 1939, 205).9
The system of medical audit devised by Ponton and MacEachern aimed to provide a compre-
hensive analysis not only of the activities of medical staff, but of all other resources that enabled
physicians to provide their patients with the best treatment possible. Ponton and MacEachern sug-
gested that the quantity and quality of the physical facilities of the hospital had to be appraised.
These comprised items, such as the accommodation for patients, about which the audit sought to
determine whether its amount, safety, comfort and maintenance were adequate. Similarly, equip-
ment and supplies were assessed in order to ascertain if the quantity and quality was sufficient to
meet need and usage, and to determine whether they were used efficiently. Ponton and MacEach-
ern observed that while the management of equipment and supplies was the responsibility of the
administrator of the hospital, medical staff had to make efforts to prevent waste and ensure that
their work was not adversely affected by substandard equipment and supplies.
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With regard to personnel, the audit aimed to demonstrate that the skills and abilities of the
professionals were adequately used, as ‘professional waste is even more culpable than financial’
(Ponton 1939, 172), and to show that hospitals had adequate training and educational programmes.
In addition, the audit assessed the quality of the work performed by the medical staff and compared
it with accepted standards. Deviations were to be explained, ensuring that the physicians and
other personnel involved in the care of patients would ‘measure up to recognised standards’.
This was strongly couched in accounting terminology as it was argued that ‘the human profit and
loss are determined and the necessary control over professional activities is exercised’ (Ponton
1939, 172).
Ponton and MacEachern also discussed the audit methodology that hospitals might employ.
They identified two methods: an audit performed by an independent physician who specialised in
medical audit, or an audit performed by a Medical Audit Committee, composed of members of
staff representative of the major clinical services. In the event that the hospital decided to engage
an independent auditor, Ponton and MacEachern stated that this ought to be a physician who had
no connection with the hospital, thereby ensuring detachment from influences that might bias his
judgement. They considered that such independence was ‘more important in the medical audit
than in that dealing with business transactions, because there is so much in the professional audit
that requires judgement rather than merely the assembling of cold facts’ (Ponton 1939, 211).
Furthermore, the auditor had to possess a number of qualifications. He had to be a physician with
experience in medical practice, possess a broad knowledge of the field and also be knowledgeable
in hospital administration and operational systems: ‘he must be both a good clinician and a
good administrator’ (Ponton 1939, 211). He was to have an ‘analytical mind’, a ‘systematist’
and be able to avail himself of the collaboration of consultants in a variety of specialties to help
him form judgements. Ponton and MacEachern acknowledged that there were very few medical
professionals who met the requirements mentioned above, and hospitals might not have funds
available to acquire such expertise. Consequently, independent audits were not expected to be
very common. In light of this, they provided a number of recommendations as to how to organise
an internal medical audit conducted by staff members (Ponton 1939; MacEachern 1952).
Ponton and MacEachern observed that medical staff carried out a form of audit unconsciously
whenever they met to discuss and review cases, thus staff were familiar with the idea of care
review and case discussion. They proposed that the audit committee should study the medical
records and select cases to be submitted to the medical staff. They stressed the importance of
impartiality when reviewing the cases and avoiding a critical approach focused on blaming staff
members. The audit was meant to allow medical staff to learn from mistakes, preventing them
and guarding against their repetition. In order to enable the medical audit committee to exercise
judgement more freely and without personal prejudice, they suggested substituting physicians’
names with codes created by the medical librarian when preparing the records and forms used
during the audit.
Ponton and MacEachern then recommended that the medical audit committee should conclude
the audit cycle by submitting reports to the governing body, monthly after each meeting, as well
as annually. The annual report was to contain an analysis of the monthly reports provided during
the year and document the recommendations that had been made in them, drawing attention to
actions taken as a result of recommendations and instances where action had not been taken.
These reports were intended for internal use and were not to be publicly disclosed. It was stressed
that the audit reports were to be used not as ‘fault-finding documents’ but: ‘should be construc-
tive in nature and every recommendation made should be supported by reasons based on facts
as they have been observed in the hospital under consideration, or by the experience of other
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hospitals’ (Ponton 1939, 204). They lamented that failure to accomplish this phase had wider
ramifications:
When such reports are not made, the recommendations of the medical staff are very apt not to be brought to the
attention of the proper administrative authority, with the ultimate result that the medical staff develops a feeling
that its wishes carry no weight. This can be corrected and better understanding promoted by formal reports made
to the governing body after each meeting of the medical staff. (Ponton 1939, 215)
Thus, the audit was not only a system for controlling the work of medical professionals, it was also
a system that allowed medical professionals’ concerns and needs to be conveyed to the managers
with the promise of action.
Embedding medical audit in hospital administration
MacEachern (1952, 73) considered medical audit as a feature of a ‘well administered and effi-
ciently functioning’ hospital. Similar to the arguments advanced earlier by Codman, the members
of the Standardisation Committee, and theACS, Ponton and MacEachern stated that the governing
body of a hospital is responsible for the quality of care it provided. Members of the governing
body delegated authority and responsibility to an administrator, who in turn, delegated authority
and responsibility to others. Ponton and MacEachern argued that within this system of devolved
responsibility, it was of paramount importance to devise a mechanism of reporting which would
be intelligible to the members of the governing body:
the governing body is usually composed of men and women with wide business experience, competent to advise on
the financial activities of the hospital and to know whether or not these matters are conducted in accordance with
good principles of financial accounting. Thus by using such principles as a guide in setting up a parallel system
of accounting in professional matters, the governing body will have a clearer understanding of all procedures.
(Ponton 1939, 171)
Furthermore, they claimed that it was possible to express the objectives of the medical audit
and professional accounting, discussed in the previous section, in the ‘language of the financial
system’ because the ‘objectives of professional accounting and medical audit are similar to those
of the financial system’ (Ponton 1939, 172). They were not proposing the precise quantification
and measurement of the performance of physicians and the hospital because ‘in professional
accounting the basis is the human equation, an intangible which has no fixed value and which
will therefore vary with each individual’ (Ponton 1939, 171). On the contrary, they envisaged a
system that would provide an accurate and complete account of the quality of care provided as
expressed via estimates and ‘authoritative opinion’. Importantly, the engagement of medical staff
in the audit was deemed essential as their expertise and knowledge of the field was necessary in
order to complete, validate and interpret the data collected by the professional accounting system
(Ponton 1939, 172). Thus, medical audit was not meant to insulate medical professionals from
the encroachment of managerial practices, as Dent (1991, 1995), Power (1997) and others have
observed in relation to the British national health-care system. Rather, audit was meant to function
as a two-way communication system between the board of directors and medical professionals.
Further, the audit was to be concerned with managing the medical staff. Ponton and MacEachern
stressed in various sections of their book that the employment and management of medical staff
was the responsibility of the hospital administrator, and as such, should not be exposed to outside
interference. The audit was designed to provide the administrator with the information necessary
to assess the quantity and quality of the work performed by the professional staff. Ponton and
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MacEachern considered this objective of the audit extremely important because it provided the
administrator and the governing body with evidence that allowed them to ‘allocate the duties and
responsibilities of the members of the medical staff in accordance with training, experience and
adaptability as shown by recorded evidence of results’ (Ponton 1939, 183). Echoing Codman, they
maintained that the competence of physicians had to be demonstrated with ‘factual data obtained
from the medical records of performance’rather than ‘reputation often founded on rumour, usually
difficult to gain, always easy to lose [and] at times influenced by personality rather than skill’
(Ponton 1939, 168).
Thus, the information provided through medical audit was considered crucial in giving hospital
administrators the authority to manage medical staff – an authority considered lacking despite the
efforts made by the ACS and the American Medical Association in standardising and controlling
the training of medical graduates:
All these attempts at control have proved to be only partially effective for one reason which is applicable to all.
There is lack of authority to limit the activities of the physician when once he has received his state licence and
there is therefore no means of keeping him within the bounds of his capabilities. (Ponton 1939, 183)
Ponton and MacEachern argued that this control ought to be exercised within the hospital
by its own medical staff. Further, the governing body was to exercise its authority in selecting
medical staff: ‘and let it be reiterated that proved, not reputed, competence should be the major
consideration in making a decision as to reappointment, promotion and assignment of duties’
(Ponton 1939, 184).
The data obtained through professional accounting, analysed with the audit, was to be discussed
by a joint advisory committee (JAC). The JAC was to be composed of members of the medical
staff and of the governing body and administrators. It was to assume the crucial role of interme-
diary between the medical staff and the management. The JAC was entrusted with the roles of
advising on the establishment of the system of professional accounting and giving assurance to
the governing body that the system was adequately maintained and adhered to. The operation of
the system was identified as a responsibility of the administrator. The JAC would receive reports
and recommendations emanating from the professional audit (Figure 3) and provide explanations
and interpretations of these reports for non-medical members, even though these reports were
intended to be written in a language that could be ‘understood by a person who is not medically
trained’. It was intended that:
By securing this interpretation in joint advisory committee meetings the non-medical members are in a position
to discuss intelligently the reports and recommendations when they are considered by the governing body as a
whole, thereby enabling that body to take action with full understanding of the wishes of the medical staff. (Ponton
1939, 173)
In addition, the JAC was to determine the efficiency and competence of the professional staff
on the basis of the audit reports and interpret these results for the governing body. Here again
interpretation was suggested as an essential role of the JAC because it guaranteed that the governing
body was in possession of accurate and reliable information about the efficiency of the care
provided. Ponton and MacEachern argued that as the governing body was responsible for the
performance of the hospital, possessing this information would enable it to take appropriate
action.
Thus, at the very beginning of the process of institutionalising medical audit in American hos-
pitals, it was medical doctors,10 supported by the ACS, who proposed the adoption of accounting
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Figure 3. Medical audit within the hospital’s organisational structure.
Source: Adapted from Ponton (1939, 170).
principles to the collection and reporting of data related to clinical activities. This was in order to
foster the engagement of the governors/trustees in the administration of the hospital and provide
them with information to discharge their accountability to the community in which the hospi-
tal operated. Thus, in contrast to later observations in the UK context (Power 1997; Dent 1991,
1995), it appears that in its early development medical audit was not constructed as a mechanism
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of resistance to the encroachment of managerial control on medical practices. It was not imposed
by external regulatory powers, but developed within a medical profession attempting to find
an appropriate balance between control, professional accountability and professional autonomy.
In the genesis of medical audit, medical professionals mobilised the language and practices of
accounting, because they sought the involvement of managers (albeit in a way that did not encroach
upon their practice) to promote improvements in the quality of care and control the competences
of fellow practitioners.
The legacy of Codman, Ponton and MacEachern
Despite the growing interest in, and implementation of, medical audit (Klicka 1948), some clin-
icians expressed reservations about the extent to which the evaluation of the quality of medical
care was effective and adequate. They sought to improve the methods of audit devised by Ponton
and MacEachern (Lembcke 1952, 1956, 1967; Myers, Slee, and Hoffmann 1955; Eisele 1956;
Myers and Slee 1956; Myers 1957; Slee 1965a, 1965b). The criticisms concerned the methods
of evaluation and the measurements adopted in the audit. The methods were considered inad-
equate and inefficient, deemed too time-consuming, too focused on deficiencies of the medical
profession and insufficiently sensitive to advances in the medical practice (Myers and Slee 1956;
Myers 1957). The measures used to assess the quality of care – the qualification of personnel,
adequacy of equipment and technical excellence – were considered ‘relative and indirect’ and not
sufficiently scientific (Lembcke 1952, 276).
Thus, a methodology that would provide uniform and objective measures of quality, using
standards that permitted the unambiguous measurement of performance was developed, enabling
time-period studies and comparisons with general standards, across institutions, and between
communities and groups of patients/treatments/conditions (Lembcke 1952, 1956, 1967; Myers,
Slee, and Hoffmann 1955; Eisele 1956; Myers and Slee 1956; Myers 1957; Slee 1965a, 1965b).
Lembcke (1952, 1956, 1967)11 developed a scientific method of medical audit. This identified a
set of objective criteria and comprised a system in which the standards used for the evaluation of
care were determined on the basis of best medical practice and research applied to the specific
contexts in which medical professionals operated. Specifically, he studied the effects of case-mix
on end results, the differences in performance due to size of hospitals, the effects of differences
in the training and experience of clinicians and commenced a discussion about evaluating the
process of care (Silver 1990). Lembcke’s work on medical audit was to influence subsequent
studies of the quality of care (Donabedian 1966, 1968, 1988, 1989; Morehead 1967; Shapiro
1967; Sanazaro 1976).
Donabedian, a distinguished scholar who performed extensive research on how to measure the
quality of care,12 praised Lembcke’s scientific method of medical audit and his work on defining
standards and criteria of evaluation. He argued that standards are a prerequisite to assessment
(Donabedian 1968). Donabedian advanced Lembcke’s work by developing a system of evaluation
that included the review of processes of care and the evaluation of outcomes. He stressed the
importance of the evaluation of total care and the identification of interactions in the care process,
where more than one professional participated (Donabedian 1968, 182). Similar to Codman,
Donabedian considered that evaluating the quality of care was fundamental because this emphasis
created the conditions that encouraged good performance.
In order for quality of care to be evaluated, Donabedian argued that practice had to be rendered
visible and this would not be achieved by sole reliance on informal mechanisms of self-evaluation.
Formal reviews, such as medical auditing would render practice visible to colleagues and thereby
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encourage improvements in quality (Donabedian 1968, 183–189). Donabedian claimed that in
response to technological imperatives, medical practice had to be conducted in organised settings
like hospitals where professional behaviour was observed by colleagues. Moreover, the hospital
was responsible for the care provided by staff. The organised provision of care and its financing
by third parties also increased the desired level of scrutiny of the quality of care: ‘As medical
care becomes more centrally important, it becomes less an exclusive professional preserve, and
increasingly an arena where diverse interests clamour to be heard’ (Donabedian 1968, 192).
Donabedian called upon the medical profession to become organised in ways more amenable to
the supervision of performance and quality control. He emphasised that this responsibility should
be shared with hospital management:
In the final analysis, it may not be possible to delegate the responsibility for the quality of medical care either to
the organisation or to the professional staff. It may have to be shared, so that the professional may bring pressure
to bear upon the organisation and vice versa. The creation and perpetuation of such a state of tension may be the
only way to assure that the quality of care is maintained. (Donabedian 1968, 195)
Lembcke’s work was instrumental in the incorporation of medical audit in the work of the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Hospital Organizations (JCAHO) (Roberts, Coale, and Redman
1987). The JCAHO was established in 1951 by the ACS, the American College of Physicians,
the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association and the Canadian Medical
Association. By 1950, the scope and size of the hospital standardisation programme had escalated.
The number of hospitals seeking the approval of the ACS grew to 3290, which was more than
50% of hospitals in the USA (Roberts, Coale, and Redman 1987). The ACS found itself under
pressure, not only because of the increasing number of hospitals which applied for approval, but
also because of the increasing sophistication of medical care, the growing complexity of hospitals
and the expansion of non-surgical specialities. The latter issues required a major revision and
expansion of the minimum standards set two decades earlier by the ACS hospital standardisation
programme.
Thus, the JCAHO (renamed the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals (JCAH))
was created as an independent not-for-profit organisation, specifically for the promotion and
improvement of voluntary accreditation. Each professional organisation appointed members of
the Board of Commissioners, the JCAH governing body. The JCAH continued the work of the
ACS, surveying hospitals that voluntarily applied for accreditation. At the same time, it sought to
improve standards, in particular by focusing on the process of review and evaluation of the quality
of care adopted by hospitals, and by promoting medical audit procedures that were systematic
and incorporated objective and valid criteria for measuring the quality of care and competence
of medical professionals. In the USA, from 1972, medical audits became a requirement of the
Professional Standards Review Organisation (Roberts, Coale, and Redman 1987).
Conclusions
The evidence and discussion presented in this paper reveal that medical audit was a fundamental
constituent of medical professionals’ concerns about quality of care, long before it became a
‘contested terrain’ (Power 1997). While there is some truth in the assumption that audit was a
means of defending the interests of the medical profession against increasing demands of public
scrutiny and accountability (Dent 1991, 1993, 1995), this view diminishes the role that medical
audit has played in medical professionals’ reflective thinking about what they do, how they do it,
and how they engage in processes of reviewing and improving practices.
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Medical audit emerged at a crucial point in the history of the development of medicine. At the
beginning of the twentieth century, medicine was being transformed from a craft into science.
Scientific and technological progress changed approaches to the diagnosis of diseases and their
treatment. Medical professionals were becoming more specialised. In the USA, the structure
of medical education was being scrutinised, becoming more formalised. Laboratory studies and
clinical teaching were increasingly incorporated into the medical school curriculum (Dodds 1993).
In the wake of the influential Flexner Report (Barr 2011), the Carnegie Foundation and the General
Education Board (a philanthropic organisation established by John D. Rockefeller) generously
sponsored the reform of medical education. Between 1910 and 1920, the number of medical
schools was halved (Barr 2011). Hospitals were being transformed into complex institutions for
the treatment of patients and the teaching and training of medical students.
We could argue that at that time, and in the context of an absence of coercive regulation by
political institutions, medical professionals were coming to grips with establishing normative,
regulative and cognitive processes to strengthen the legitimacy of their professional activity and
that of hospitals as institutions for the cure of diseases (Ruef and Scott 1998). Medical auditing was
implicated in the establishment of regulative institutions and cognitive rules within the professional
boundaries (Scarparo 2011).13
Pioneers of medical auditing, such as Codman, Ponton and MacEachern argued that it was the
responsibility of medical professionals to assess the results of the treatments they performed and
demonstrate their competence to practice. They contended that audit could offer mechanisms for
assessing the quality of care and would enhance the visibility of self-reflection and learning. Med-
ical audit was promoted as a technology that allowed medical professionals to conduct a formal,
organised review of medical practice, which would provide reliable information on performance
of the structure, processes and outcomes of care. It would encourage a critical assessment of
patient care and indicate the need for necessary changes.
These findings show that medical audit was originally intended to serve as a mechanism for
improving the quality of care rather than as a mechanism to protect the medical profession from
managerial and/or governmental control, as observed in the UK context in the second half of
the century (Power 1997; Dent 1991, 1995; Pollitt 1993). Furthermore, the evidence presented in
our paper shows how medical audit can also be conceived as an example of collaborative space
rather than a ‘contested field’. In contrast with the analysis of medical audit in the British NHS,
we have seen that the early promoters of medical audit called for the greater involvement of
senior managers in the supervision and monitoring of the quality of care provided in hospitals.
These medical professionals, who occupied influential roles in medical associations, deployed
accounting language and practices to advance medical audit as a collaborative managerial tool
that would provide medics and management with reliable information for managing professional
work in hospitals. Medical audit would permit the assessment of competence to practice, ade-
quacy of deployment, and access to training and educational programmes. It would also facilitate
accountability to the local community.
To the modern-day observer it is striking that the ideas advanced by the pioneers of the evaluation
of the quality of care and of medical professionals’work appear so familiar. The pursuit of quality
also appears to be as elusive now, as it was in the early twentieth century.
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Notes
1. The websites http://trove.nla.gov.au/ and http://www.hathitrust.org/ were particularly useful.
2. In Scotland it was to be a Hospital and Community Health Medical Audit Advisory Committee in each Health Board
area, and in England a District Medical Audit Advisory Committee in each district.
3. In other contexts, notably Sweden, medical professionals regarded the public disclosure of quality data as potentially
advantageous (Levay and Waks 2009).
4. Codman alienated the members of the Suffolk (Massachusetts) District Surgical Society when, during a meeting held
at the Boston Medical Society in 1915, he unveiled a cartoon that showed an ostrich burying his head under the sand
and kicking up golden eggs (Wrege 1983). The ostrich represented the surgeons and hospital administrators who
did not want to study their own results but were happy to lay golden eggs. The local press (Boston Post and Boston
Daily Globe) reported the story ‘(Cartoon raises surgeon’s ire: Dr Codman stirs up medical society’) and the Suffolk
Medical Society asked Codman to resign from its Surgical Section, which he did.
5. The other members of the Committee were as follows. J.G. Clarke MD (no biographical data available); W.J. Mayo,
MD, FACS, a highly respected physician and surgeon who studied at the University of Michigan and one of the founders
of the Mayo Clinic and President of the ACS from 1917 to 1920 (http://www.facs.org/archives/presidentslist.html).
Allen B. Kanavel, an internationally renowned surgeon, who graduated from Northwestern University Medical School,
where he subsequently became Head of the Surgical department. He was editor of Surgery, Gynecologyand Obstetrics,
one of the organisers of the ACS, on which he served on the Board of Regents and was also as its President from
1931 to 1932 (Phemister 1938). W.W. Chipman, MD, CM, FRCS, Professor of Gynaecology and Obstetrics at McGill
University, Montreal who was one of the founding members of the ACS, studied at Edinburgh University and worked
at Edinburgh Royal Infirmary, Bolton Infirmary and the Royal Victoria Hospital, Canada. He was President of the
ACS from 1926 to 1927 (http://www.facs.org/archives/presidentslist.html).
6. After his resignation Codman served in the Army during the First World War. He struggled to rebuild his surgical
practice on his return from military service. He died in 1940 and was buried in an unmarked grave as he thought that
the cost of a headstone would have been a financial burden for his wife.
7. The book was revised and updated by MacEachern and republished in 1953, leaving Ponton as the sole author. Thus,
in this paper, when referring to this publication we cite Ponton (1939).
8. The Standard Nomenclature of Diseases and Operations was initially published in 1928 by the New York Medical
Association before responsibility for its maintenance and revision was transferred to theAmerican MedicalAssociation
in 1937. It was the standard reference work for diagnosis.
9. The following items were deemed to be illustrative of quality of care and therefore analysed and reported on by the
audit: end results of the care provided to patients (classified as recovered, not recovered, improved, not improved,
not treated, in for diagnosis only, died); death rate expressed as a ratio of all deaths to total discharges and deaths
in a given period, analysed for the hospital as a whole, by the services provided and by physicians; anaesthesia
death rate, i.e. deaths caused by anaesthetic agents; postoperative death rate, i.e. death connected with an operation;
maternal death rate, i.e. the ratio of maternal death to obstetrical discharges; infant death rate, i.e. the ratio of death of
infants newly born in the hospital to viable deaths; autopsy rate, considered to provide a proxy measure of scientific
interest of medical staff; consultations, i.e. rate of formal consultations (those held at the bedside, for which the
findings are recorded and there is evidence of study of the patient history and of physical examination of the patient);
complications, as they are considered to be potential indication of weaknesses in the service; infection rate, useful for
assessing the competence of surgical and obstetrical services; unnecessary surgery; average length of stay; percentage
of occupancy (80% was deemed the limit for efficient bedside care).
10. The following authors/publications a represent a sample of works that documented and discussed the implementation
of the model of medical audit devised by Ponton and MacEachern, stressing the benefits on the improved quality of care
and on the engagement of management/governing body in the activities of the hospitals: Editorial (1950), Weinerman
(1951), Agnew (1951), Herman (1952), Sereda and Hanson (1952), Smith (1953), Mortund (1953), Krause (1953),
Sister Justina (1954), Berry (1954), Hawley (1954), Myers and Stephenson (1954), Letourneau (1954), Johnson
(1955a, 1955b), Harm (1955), Johnson (1956), Sewall and Davidson (1956), Eisele (1956), Myers (1957), Butler and
Quinlan (1958), Munter and Berke (1958), Gogan (1959), Plewes (1959), Editorial Comments (1959), and Sewall
and Berger (1959).
11. Lembcke graduated in medicine at the University of Rochester, where he trained in Paediatrics. In 1935, he joined
the New York State Department of Health. He subsequently completed a Master of Public Health at Johns Hopkins
School of Hygiene and Public Health. He worked for a few years for the Rochester State Health District and in 1944
became the director of the newly created New York State Legislative Commission on Medical Care and later became
Associate Director of the Council of Rochester Regional Hospitals. In 1951, he was appointed Associate Professor
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of Public Health Administration at Johns Hopkins School of Hygiene and Public Health with the remit to direct the
graduate programme in hospital administration, and was an Associate in the administration of the hospital. Whilst
working at Johns Hopkins he published his seminal work on medical audit, and studied hospital administration in
Sweden and Israel funded by the Rockefeller Foundation and the World Health Organisation. In 1957, he became
Professor of Preventive Medicine in the Medical School and Professor of Public Health at the University of California
in Los Angeles (Silver 1990).
12. Avedis Donabedian was a Nathan Sinai Distinguished Professor of Public Health at the University of Michigan.
13. By regulative institutions we mean ‘explicit regulative processes: rule-setting, monitoring, and sanctioning activities’
(Scott 1995, 35), and by cognitive rules we mean ‘rules that specify what types of actors are allowed to exist … and
what procedures they can follow’ (Ruef and Scott 1998, 879).
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